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have no knowledge about particular facts that could
lead them to prefer principles of justice partial to those
they represent. The veil of ignorance is thus an important part of Rawls's argument that his conception of
justice-justice as fairness-is the best conception for a
democratic society.

The OriginalPosition

VEIL OF IGNORANCEIN
RAWLSIANTHEORY
As part of his effort to answer the question "What is the
best conception of justice for a democratic society?"
philosopher John Rawls constructed a thought experiment called the original position. In the original position, representatives of members of society choose
principles of justice for society in light of limited interests and with limited information. Situated behind the
veil of ignorance, the parties in the original position

Taking a closer look at the terms of Rawls's question
provides a number of clues to its answer. From a closer
look at the idea of justice, we get ideas of the role, subject, circumstances, and formal constraints of justice.
From a closer look at the idea of a democratic society,
we get the ideas of social cooperation between free and
equal citizens, reciprocity, and fairness. The best conception of justice for a democratic society is the conception
of justice that best satisfies and expresses these many
ideas.
Different conceptions of justice do better at satisfying
different ideas; some better satisfy the formal constraints
of justice-generality, publicity, and stability-while
others do better at capturing the notions of fairness,
reciprocity, and equality. How can we find a way to
rank candidate conceptions of justice that allows us to
say that one of these does better than the rest at satisfying and expressing these ideas?
Rawls's answer to the problem of how to rank conceptions of justice is the original position. The original
position is constructed to turn the scatter of ideas
about justice for a democratic society into a device that
ranks conceptions of justice according to how well they
satisfy and express them. In this manner, the original
position models what we generally believe and hope
for when we think about justice for a democratic
society-in other words, our normative beliefs on this
subject.
The original position is inspired by the social contract tradition. In this tradition, the legitimacy and
obligating power of political authority stems from the
wills of those who are subjected to it as their will either
was or could be expressed in a social contract. The
social contract tradition draws on two powerful
strands in Western moral philosophy: first, the principle that no person has natural authority over another
person and that interpersonal coercion, therefore, is
permissible only when exercised according to reasons
acceptable to the coerced; second, that consent and
promises carry obligation: if I voluntarily consent to
some agreement, then this consent creates new rights
and obligations. If we bring these two ideas together,
we get the idea that all political authority must be generated by the acts of those party to the authority
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relation-in
short, by people coming together in a
social contract in which they agree to create and
respect political authority that legislates and enforces
laws on behalf of all.
Rawls draws on the social contract tradition, but
the ranking of principles of justice that issue from the
original position is not a social contract. The original
position is a thought experiment that helps us think
clearly about what justice requires. The hypothetical
agreement of the original position is not the source of
political authority or political obligation-it does not
produce laws and institutions or any agreement to
obey laws and institutions. Instead, Rawls's contractualism is found in his endorsement of the liberal principle of legitimacy, which says that the exercise of
political authority must take place in accordance with
principles that all those subjected to it could agree to
in a situation that respects their status as free and equal
moral persons. The original position helps us identify
what these principles are and shows what we can agree
to as free and equal moral persons. The aim of the
original position is to answer the question: What is the
best conception of justice for a democratic society? It
does so by modeling what we already believe about
justice and democratic society. The original position is
not meant to introduce any additional materials into
the argument but to take the materials we already have
at hand and use them to construct a way to make clear
what they imply. In a sense, the original position is
simply a device that helps us think through our commitments and considered convictions about democratic society and be clear about what we already
believe.
. In the_tho~ght experiment that is the original position, we 1magme that representatives of all members of
s?ciety come together and choose a conception of justice that those they represent will live by. The parties
are given a list of candidate conceptions and rank them
by running a pairwise comparison-A is better than B
but C is better than A, and so on-until they hav;
a_rrived~t a_de~inite order. The highest-ranking conception of Justice ts the best one for a democratic society.
The original position, accordingly, plays an epistemic
role in Rawls 's argument for principles of justice: it
helps us think about what justice requires. Further, the
force of the original position argument is a function of
the force of the assumptions that go into it. If Rawls
has identified the right ideas about justice for a democratic society, and if these ideas are well expressed in
the original position, and if the parties would prefer
justice as fairness to any other candidate conception of
justice, then we can confidently say that justice as fairness is the best conception of justice for a democratic
society.

The Veil of Ignorance
The original position models our beliefs about justice
for a democratic society by defining the knowledge and
interests of the parties and by requiring that all candidate conceptions of justice satisfy the formal constraints
of the concept of right. The veil of ignorance defines the
knowledge of the parties; it shields them from knowledge of particular facts that they could use to favor
particular members of society while at the same time
allowing them knowledge of general facts that are helpful for thinking about justice in general. The veil of
ignorance thus expresses a commitment to a sort of
imparti ality that is needed to ensure that the principles
we select express our commitments to fairness and
equal citizenship. To ensure this impartiality, the veil of
ignorance shields the parties from knowledge about the
people they represent: about their gender, race, religious
beliefs, wealth, and similar facts. The parties are also
ignorant of particular facts about the society those they
represent live in, such as how religious beliefs are distributed, what natural resources their society has access
to, and the distribution of wealth and opportunities.
While the veil of ignorance shields the parties from
knowledge that could lead them to propose unfair terms
of social cooperation, it lets them know enough about
the general conditions of democratic societies to rank
candidate conceptions of justice. So the parties know
that those they represent have a conception of the good
(but not what it is); they know general facts about
human needs and psychology; that they are in circumstances of justice (where social cooperation is both
necessary and possible); they know theories of sociology and economics and that their society contains a
plurality of philosophical, religious, political, and social
doctrines.
That the veil of ignorance leaves the parties without
any knowledge about the interests of those they repre~en~or even about the distribution of interests in society
mv~tes.the question of how they can rank conceptions
of Justice-for what interests do they have that could
lead them to have preferences between different candidate conceptions?

Interestsof the Parties:PrimaryGoods
Rawls's answer is that the parties know that those they
represent have some conception of the good, that circumstances of justice are present, and what the general
needs of human beings are. In light of this knowledge
the parties will try to procure for those they represen;
certain all-purpose means that are generally needed
by members of a democratic society. Rawls calls these
all-purpose means primary goods.
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The primary goods serve three general interests of
democratic citizens: first, their interest in developing
their capacity for a conception of the good (their first
moral power); second, their interest in developing their
capacity for a sense of justice (their second moral
power); and, third, their interest in having adequate allpurpose means for pursuing their conception of the
good-no matter what it is. This account of the three
basic interests of democratic citizenship supports the
following list of primary goods:
1. Basic rights and liberties
2. Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation
3. Power and prerogatives and opportunities for access
to positions and offices
4. Income and wealth
5. The social bases of self-respect

The parties are interested in securing for those they
represent basic rights and liberties necessary for the
development of their moral powers; opportunities for
access to offices and positions; and as large a share of
income and wealth as they can get.
Note that the parties are "mutually disinterested":
they care only to maximize the position of those they
represent without regard for the position of others. This
mutual disinterestedness expresses their equal claim to
the fruits of cooperation and a rejection of envy as indicator of injustice. The fact that others have more than
oneself is not a reason to suspect injustice in the
system-what
matters is whether the distribution
wherein they have more (or less) arose from fair cooperation. If the system of rules (the basic structure) is just,
then the fact that others have more than oneself offers
no reason for complaint.
The parties also are interested in choosing a conception of justice that can be stable, meaning that it
generates its own support over time. If, for example, a
conception of justice tends to create distrust or resentment among citizens, this undermines its ability to support a stable system of institutions-in effect, making it
harder to have a society that is ordered by this conception of justice-and this then counts as a reason against
this conception.

The Limited
Usefulness
of the Veil of Ignorance
There is no actual situation like the original position.
The original position is not some legislative assembly
that might happen or could have happened. The veil of
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ignorance is not something that we could create in the
real world (and even if we could, it is not clear why we
would do it). Again, the original position is a thought
experiment with imaginary characters that think about
justice using only knowledge and interests relevant for
the question-this could not happen. It is better to think
of the original position as a device that sorts conceptions of justice according to how well they fit the basic
ideas of democratic society and democratic citizenship
than as a bargaining situation in which parties negotiate
for principles.
That the original position and the veil of ignorance
it employs are hypothetical, imaginary, and impossible
is not an objection to it. If it truly expresses the fundamental normative commitments of democratic society
and helps us sort candidate conceptions of justice
according to how well they satisfy these commitments,
then it is useful for thinking clearly about justice for a
democratic society.
Since the veil of ignorance models ideas about justice
and not a particular view of human nature or human
psychology, it is supposed to stand free of commitments
to any particular metaphysics of personhood-for
example, that people were or were not created by
God-and particular theories of personal or collective
psychology. Instead, the view of the person that informs
the original position and the veil of ignorance is normative: the veil of ignorance is constructed from ideals of
democratic citizenship and democratic society. These
ideals do, of course, suppose certain facts about human
nature, human society, and human psychology-that we
have needs, that we are modestly rational, that we are
social creatures, that we are in circumstances of justice
and thus can cooperate with others on fair terms-but
the original position and the veil of ignorance are not
directly modeling these assumptions. Instead, the veil of
ignorance models only the point of view relevant for
thinking about justice for a democratic society, and the
intent, at least, is that this can be done without assuming any controversial metaphysics of personhood or
theory of individual or political psychology.
Rawls's veil of ignorance is designed to deal with a
specific question: What is the best conception of justice
for a democratic society? It is a mistake to think that the
same veil would be helpful for answering other questions. If one wants to investigate justice in the workplace, or family, or environmental justice, one could
construct an original position with a veil of ignorance
suitable to these aims (just as Rawls designed another
veil for the original position relevant to international
justice), but the veil of ignorance that Rawls designed
for the case of domestic justice should not be used for
these questions. Again, in Rawlsian theory, the original
position with its veil of ignorance and interests of the
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parties are constructed from the particular question that
it helps us answer-to use it for other questions is to
misunderstand what it is and does.

OtherVeils
By limiting the knowledge of the parties in the original
position, the veil of ignorance expresses an ideal of
impartiality. As such, it stands in a long tradition of
similar notions and thought experiments such as Bishop
Butler's court of conscience, Adam Smith's impartial
spectator, David Hume's judicious spectator, and
Immanuel Kant's standpoint of pure practical reason.
The idea of taking an impartial perspective-and of
limiting the first-personal preferences as a way of securing impartiality-has been perfected in utilitarian ethics, where the moral point of view is one that counts the
subjective well-being of all persons equally. Though
neither used the same name as Rawls, John Harsanyi
developed a utilitarian version of a veil of ignorance in
the 1950s, and Friedrich August von Hayek used a similar device in his derivation of principles of justice in the
Constitution of Liberty, published in 1960. Rawls did
not invent the veil of ignorance; rather, he appropriated
and adapted an available idea.
A utilitarian veil of ignorance allows the parties
complete information about their society, including the
preferences of individual members of society, but
deprives them of information about what position they
occupy (or the position of those they represent). The
result is that they choose principles that maximize average utility. Such a utilitarian veil of ignorance is thinner
than the one employed by Rawls because it allows the
parties more information. Other theories of justice
might defend a thicker veil of ignorance than the one
employed by Rawls. For example, if one believes that
justice should not be influenced by general facts about
human psychology, then the veil should shield the parties from these facts (Gerald A. Cohen and others who
share his views on the nature of justice could go in this
direction). Deliberate democrats might follow Jurgen
Habermas and argue that debates about politics should
take place with full information.
These disagreements about the thickness of the veil
of ignorance express underlying disagreements about
the nature of justice-about what question we are using
the veil of ignorance to answer and of the assumptions
within the question. Utilitarians and socialists would not
be persuaded by Rawls's original-position arguments,
for they would reject his characterization of the veil of
ignorance (and perhaps also of the interests of the parties), but this simply shows that their assumptions about
justice differ. Again, the veil of ignorance, and the original position more generally, only work as arguments for

the principles of justice as fairness for those who accept
that Rawls has identified both the right question and the
assumptions built into the question and that these are
properly expressed by the original position. Different
arguments are needed to show that the question,
assumptions, and construction are as Rawls saw them.
Perhaps disappointingly, the veil of ignorance in Rawlsian theory only works as an argument for those already
committed to the basic assumptions of Rawlsian liberalism, and it cannot serve as an independent argument
against utilitarianism, socialism, or other theories of
justice that do not accept these assumptions.
Jeppe von Platz
See also Citizenship; Democracy; Distributive Justice; Equality
of Opportunity; Liberalism; Political Deliberation;
Procedural Justice; Social Contract
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